1. General introduction
1.1. A prolonged emergency in organised crime over the last twenty years has forced Italy, at regular intervals, to issue stronger measures to cope with the attacks and threats by criminal subversive associations, by the Mafia or by Mafia-type subversive associations.
1.2. The awareness of the virulence and the dimensions of the various criminal groups has forced the Italian State to adopt subtle and sophisticated means apt to counteract the many-sided and changeable aspects of this phenomenon. As previously mentioned, this phenomenon now represents a kind of "deadly cancer deeply affecting the economic and social tissues, thus producing metastasis which at close range threaten the very heart of the State" (quotation from "Rapporto d'Italia" - Report on Italy - Introductory paper presented by the Italian Ministry of Justice at the World Conference of Justice Ministers on trans-national organised crime, Naples 21-23 November 1994).
1.3. For some time the Italian legislation has had provisions aimed at counteracting the multiple aspects of organised crime. These provisions affect the variety of ways in which organised crime reveals itself and, in turn and according to the single cases, give priority to prevention or to sanctions, trials and detention.
1.4. These measures are closely interrelated and should be considered as unitary whole. They reflect a system where one measure leads to another, and where changes to one rule may have quite unsuspected effects on the functionality of apparently quite different rules. To give an example this applies to the provision on "reduced sentences" for Mafia bosses who co-operate with the judiciary and whose "investigating productivity" depends on the enforcement of an opposite rule which defines an extremely rigorous detention regime for Mafia bosses who refuse "to co-operate" and maintain an attitude of total "closure" during trial.
1.5. Interdependency between the different rules against organised crime is now to be considered as an extremely important fact. This interdependency explains why any change to the present system is viewed with apprehension and fear as it may represent (or may simply be interpreted by its recipients) as a "lowering of the guard" or the collapse of institutions vis-à-vis the criminal phenomenon. Such a fear has for example caused criticism to be expressed over the text of the new laws issued in Italy for the protection of supergrasses, and over the expected changes to pre-trial custody.
1.6. This does not mean that we should consider our present system as infallible and not in need of change. On the contrary, the majority of those working in this field believe it essential to adjust some of the rules to the newly established order and to counterplay the changes taking place within the criminal organisations. The need to increase the use of international co-operation tools at all levels and in all ways is deeply felt, especially in order to facilitate the detection of money laundering of the re-use of illegal proceeds and consequent counteractions.

2. Towards a possible definition of organised crime
2.1. The need to issue a new cohesive legal framework arises of course from the perception, especially by law enforcement authorities and investigating judiciary, that the "counterparts" are not mere "bandit" or delinquent groups, but political and criminal organisations. Such organisations have always exerted a sort of alternative sovereignty on the territory by contrasting the state's sovereignty and by subduing citizens to their will limiting their freedom of determination. According to an authoritative doctrine, the only reliable definition of "organised crime" comes from this vaguely sociological "perception". In fact, according to this theory, "organised crime" refers to those acts which in all ways can be linked to the activities of criminal organisations having "invasive" characteristics and purposes (political or economic).
2.2. Our legal framework lacks a legal definition of organised crime. This lack causes some problems in the legal interpretation and in the enforcement of legal provisions. A careful reading of the present rules makes it possible to find in some of them (see especially art. 4-bis L. 26.7.1975, n. 354 and art. 407 sub-section 2 letter a) Criminal Procedure Code) a notion referring to crimes and "organised crime" conduct which may be considered an acceptable guideline for experts. To date, the legislative body recognises three categories of "organised crime" as such.
2.3. The first category includes crimes falling within the responsibilities of the National anti-Mafia Prosecutor and the district prosecutors (i.e. all Mafia-related crimes: Mafia-like criminal conspiracy, kidnapping for extortion, organisation aimed at drug smuggling, crimes to facilitate the activity of Mafia associations or make use of the threatening conditions which characterize them).
2.4. The second category includes social emergency crimes for which the public prosecutor at the court of appeal may exert arrogation powers (i.e. the power to "replace" the District Prosecutor who would normally have jurisdiction over the investigations). Here we refer to crimes involving terrorist attacks or subversion (see art. 372 sub-section 1-bis, Criminal Procedure Code) - such as bombings, attacks, armed robbery, terrorist kidnapping......- and criminal conspiracy in general.
2.5. Finally, the third category refers to a set of crimes which although not necessarily considered within organised crime, however prove to be functional to it (such as robbery, extortion, unauthorised possession of fire-arms and drug smuggling...: see art. 118-bis from the Criminal Procedure Code relating to art. 275 sub-section 2 Criminal Procedure Code).
2.6. The substantial differences existing between the different categories mean that not everyone receives the same sanction, in terms of trial or detention, and that the measures vary: they have "decreasing strength" depending on whether we are dealing with Mafia crimes or with "generical or common crimes . Typical examples: wire tapping or search warrants for entire buildings (only permitted for Mafia crimes) (see articles 25-bis and 25-ter Law Decree 306/1992); or crimes implying various degrees of enforcement of the "detention regime" (see art. 4-bis Law 354/1975) (determining the absolute prohibition of benefits for Mafia convicts and a "conditioned prohibition" for others condemned for criminal organisation offences.

3. New penalties for terrorism and subversion and the developments of the law on 'supergrasses'
3.1. The impact the democratic institutions had with politically -originated terrorism caused the legislators to determine new crime figures, especially after the Judiciary had encountered difficulties in dealing with crimes committed against the State's personality for subversive activities by groups active in Italy from the mid-seventies to the mid-eighties, as laid down in the Criminal Code (see articles 241-313 Criminal Code)
3.2. Law Decree n.625 dated 15.12.1979, for example, introduced new cases of crimes of association (see art. 270-bis: Terrorist or subversive association against the democratic order) and new cases for specific crimes (see art. 280 of the Criminal Code, Terrorist or subversive attacks). The same law decree though it introduced new aggravating and extenuating circumstances for the perpetrators of terrorist or subversive crimes (see articles 1 and 4 of the Law Decree 625/1979) provides for the first specific, direct and systematic political-judiciary action to develop co-operation during trial or, in other words, provisions to reduce sentences or to encourage co-operation with the authorities.
3.3. Law Decree 625/1979 represented the first systematic approach to a subject - still related to crimes of subversion - that later underwent further improvements (see Law 28.5.1982, n. 304 and Law 18.2.1987, n.34). Amongst other things, these provisions establish the possibility to differentiate depending on whether defendants have offered full co-operation, or have only stated their dissociation: this means a withdrawal from the association they belonged to, not accompanied by accusations against their accomplices or leading to the reconstruction of criminal events attributed to such organisations.
3.4. Many believe that the provisions to reduce sentences have offered a substantial contribution to "defeating" terrorist groups, although there is still debate over the reasons which led members of such groups to become "supergrasses" and accept the consequences of ideological defeat.
3.5. The application of reduced sentences also to members of criminal Mafia-like organisations who decide to co-operate with the magistrates, was delayed because of fear that the absence of ideological reasons underlying their crimes would make the enforcement of such laws on reduced sentences and prison benefits "immoral". This is due to the belief that Mafia criminals decide to offer their contribution only for utilitarian reasons, such as revenge against rival clan members.
3.6. Regardless of the occasional reduced sentence schemes for "dissociated" offenders accused of kidnapping for extortion (art. 630 sub-sections 4 and 5 Criminal Code introduced by Law 30.12.1980, n. 894) and drug-related crimes (see articles 73 and 74 Presidential Decree 9.10.1990, n. 309 and by art. 14 Law 26.6.1990, n. 162), only by the end of 1990 were decisions made to adopt special aggravating and extenuating circumstances for Mafia crimes as well as a series of further benefits and protection schemes or aid to those willing to co-operate with the legal authorities (see articles 7 and 8 Law Decree 13.5.1991, n. 152; articles 9-16 Law Decree 15.1.1991, n. 8; Leg. Decree 29.3.1993, n. 119 and Ministerial Decree 24.11.1994, n. 687).
3.7. The importance of the choice made at the time (and later improved with provisions for control and protection schemes) requires a brief explanation. The reduced sentence scheme in use in Italy at present, applies to all organised crime informants and includes a number of closely-related rules which emphasise the aforementioned legal interdependency.

We may briefly outline the following:
a. The system makes allowances for extenuating circumstances in favour of those who dissociate from the criminal organisation and provide information on its structure and on acts committed by its members (see art. 8 Law Decree 13.5.1991, n.152).
b "Supergrasses" and their families can benefit from protection schemes and programmes (articles 9-16 Law Decree 15.1.1991, n.8) enforced by the appropriate bodies with specific emphasis upon the Central Commission (chaired by an Under-Secretary of State and consisting of two magistrates and five officials expert in organised crime investigations and trials) and the Central Protection System (established by the State Security Department).
c. Before the definition of the protection programme, the Public Prosecutor reports on the extent of the contribution given by the supergrass to the investigations or to the final judgement.
d. Protection programmes (defined by appropriate "headings") may include, apart from financial aid, the change of name and address (Leg. Decree 29.3.1993, n. 119), transfer to protected places and any other measure notwithstanding the provisions in force in the prison regime field.
e. Supergrasses may receive detention benefits (special permits, outside jobs, early release, probation, home detention, half-freedom, temporary social security assignment...) notwithstanding any pre-determined time limit (see articles 4-bis 58-ter and 58-quater Law 26.7.1975, n. 354 amended by articles 14 and 15 Law Decree 8.6.1992, n. 306).
f. Supergrasses may be detained in places other than a prison structure (art. 13 and 13-bis Law Decree 8/1991) for security reasons and for the time required to draw up the protection programme.
g. There is a provision regarding investigative interviews to encourage co-operation during trial with the aim to prevent and counteract organised crime (art. 18-bis Law 354/1975).
h. The protected supergrass may be questioned during trial with particular care for his safety, or where feasible, by resorting to the use of technical means like an audio-visual link (so-called remote interrogation: art. 147-bis Criminal Procedure Code).

4. Reduced sentences vs. strict enforcement of regulations
4.1. As an alternative to the previously mentioned reduced sentences for those who decide to co-operate with the judiciary, we also have the rigid enforcement of the law for those accused or condemned for organised crime who are unwilling to co-operate with the authorities.
4.2. According to the law, in fact, where a person accused or condemned for Mafia crimes is concerned (or in a wider sense, with some differences, for "organised crime") only co-operating he can prove dissociation from the criminal organisation concerned. Only through co-operation non-differentiated and non rigid conditions become applicable. A series of consenquences relatively to sanctions and detention stems from the aforesaid, they can be summed up in the enforcement of significant aggravating circumstance for ordinary crimes (such as theft, extortion, murder) committed in aid or abetting Mafia organisations, or taking advantage of their methods (art. 7 Law Decree 152/1991) and in the exclusion for those accused and condemned for Mafia crimes from the list of those who may benefit from alternative measures to detention (awaiting trial or "already sentenced") (see specifically art. 275 sub-section 3 Criminal Procedure Code and art 4-bis Law 354/1975).
4.3. In addition to these strict provisions we also include those (see art. 41-bis sub-section 2 Law 354/1975) enabling the Minister of Justice to suspend the ordinary prison regime for organised crime offenders (i.e. visiting time, outdoor exercise, receiving parcels from outside), the reason for this being the well known capacity of some convicts to influence their accomplices' behaviour from within the prison walls. Based on its experience from previous trials, the Constitutional Court can exclude the unlawfulness of the restrictive provisions described. Furthermore, these provisions, when enforced, do not involve anti-humanitarian measures, but simply involve appropriate measures for avoiding further crimes.
4.4. The information described so far shows the close link between the sanctionary and the detention schemes for those accused and condemned for organised crime, and also clarifies - even though still partially - the system chosen by the Italian legislator to counteract this phenomenon. We must stress that resort made to forms of functional "pragmatism" has produced effective results in the investigations and trials and has also opened wide gaps inside the criminal organisations.

5. Actions related to proceedings and to investigating bodies
5.1. The need for a response to "organised crime" through "organised institutional modules" appropriate to the threat to be counteracted, was greatly felt by the law-makers who set up new investigating structures and made use of deeply innovative "functional tools" for our legal tradition. It goes without saying that these new tools have called for changes in the legal framework on preventive and ordinary trial-related provisions.
5.2. As for changes made to the ordinary provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code, we may just remember that a number of provisions issued in 1991 (see Law Decree 13.5.1991, n. 152; Law Decree 9.9.1991, n. 292, and Law Decree 20.11.1991, n. 367) and Law Decree 8.6.1992, n. 306 (so-called Falcone decree) issued after the Capaci attack and later converted into Law 7.8.1992, n. 356 issued after the Via d'Amelio attack in Palermo, were all enforced with the following aims:
a. to enable the best use of investigation records during trials and an easier circulation of evidence amongst related trials;
b. to protect confidentiality of the sources of evidence (preventing the defendant from knowing such information too early, and anyhow at a time when such evidence could be corrupted or its authenticity be compromised);
c. to detect in an innovative way the object, procedures and time schedule of investigations.
The above-mentioned provisions have produced doubts in scholars, but have also had the double merit of limiting the danger that in the pre-trial stage criminal organisations could jeopardise the truth-ascertaining process, and of enabling the investigating bodies to pursue "secret investigations" for an adequate period of time on the basis of the investigation needs of the trial at issue.
5.3. These provisions seem to be even more important if we try to connect them to those introduced some time ago to strengthen the investigative bodies. Let us take for example the establishment (in 1991) of police centralised services, sometimes including members from other police forces, aimed at co-ordinating the investigations of other police units in the field of social alarm crime, or at carrying out directly an investigation marked by operational urgency, mobility or flexibility on the whole territory. The establishment of the Anti-Mafia Investigative Administration (D.I.A.) and the creation of anti-crime centralised services for each police force (S.C.O. for the State Police, R.O.S. for the Carabinieri, S.C.I.C.O. for the Guardia di Finanza) has avoided the preventive or investigative activity in organised crime from being scattered among more than one body, at times not suitably equipped with the right specialisation and co-ordination or the adquate support of appropriate investigation links.
5.4. The establishment of the district and national anti-Mafia Enquiring Administration, that is the public prosecutor's offices in charge of Mafia investigations, is a crucial step.
5.5. Today's question is whether to increase the effective counteraction of Mafia organisations which would then require the establishment of the so-called anti-Mafia district courts: in other words, courts operating within the courts of appeal districts with the power to decide over proceedings "prepared" by the district administrations and "co-ordinated" by the national anti-Mafia administration. The latter organisation is headed by the national anti-Mafia prosecutor and represents in the first place a co-ordination body to encourage and complete the investigations with the help of data collection and processing with support provided by the criminal police.
5.6. While still on the subject of the new investigative bodies and their work, we cannot forget that the law-maker has vested them with preventive powers, not limited to trials, which include:
a. the power to proceed with wire-tapping and eavesdropping (indoor and outdoor conversations) "to prevent and inform" on matters concerning Mafia crimes (art. 25-ter Law Decree 306/1992);
b. the power to ask for and adopt special preventive measures (such as pre-trial custody) concerning those about to commit serious Mafia crimes (art. 25-quater Law Decree 06/1992);
c. the power to carry out under-cover operations through clandestine infiltration and introduction into the illegal circuit, to gain evidence in drug trafficking, money laundering and arms trafficking (see art. 97 Consolidation Act 9.10.1990, n. 309; art. 12-quater Law Decree 306/1992);
d. the power to use the information collected by the Security Services: information which is now related to criminal organisations that threat the institutions and the development of society (art. 2 sub-section 1 Decree Law 345/1991).
5.7. The above-mentioned investigative, and preventive, powers are extremely useful but we must not underestimate their insidious and intrusive nature. For these reasons the legal framework has carefully indicated their limits (both with reference to bodies entitled to use them and to the enforcement procedures and duration) and has frequently placed them under the control of the criminal police.
5.8. All this helps us to understand the importance of the choice of new tools and methods to counteract organised crime through correct professional channels and highly qualified bodies. We must in fact avoid the risk that during trial the outcome of investigations conducted with the use of the above-mentioned tools and methods may be discredited or compromised by distrust, suspicion and exploitation attempts. This obviously applies wherever legal "management" and protection of supergrasses are concerned. Here great care must be taken to avoid the danger of suspicion about pre-arranged accusation statements or doubts about the authenticity of acquired evidence.

6. Further information on the fundamentals of law
6.1. As already mentioned, the measures described up to now stem from the interpretation of criminal organisations' behaviour and from the detection of their "weak points".
With reference to the fundamentals of criminal law, we observe that the latest legal initiatives taken in Italy have stemmed from the ascertained inadequacy of ordinary crime-related laws to counteract the behaviour of organised crime. From the inadequacy of the legislation in force it has become necessary to introduce into the system an appropriate legislation for Mafia crimes, for political-Mafia electoral intrigue and for the complete range of measures to prevent money laundering and re-introduction of illegal proceeds or to uncover "questionable assets".
6.2. Experience acquired over the last decade in the legal field has shown that specific matters concerning criminal conspiracy have become a significant legal reference crucial for the fight against organised crime. Article 416-bis of the Criminal Code enables us to understand and sanction the different activities of organised crime with particular attention to the associative ties, the silence code, the control of economic activities and in particular public contracts and direct interference with the free electoral vote (see art. 416-ter Criminal Code which sanctions electoral intrigue, in other words promises of votes for money: a reality that organised crime investigations have reported as one of the most insidious areas requiring intervention in all Mafia-like associations).
6.3. The same importance is emphasised by the State as far as money laundering is concerned (articles 648-bis and 648-ter Criminal Code) and has recently been redesigned on the basis of previous legal experience and from the results presented at the Convention of Strasbourg in 1990. Fighting organised crime requires direct actions to prevent the introduction of illegal proceeds into developed areas of the country and diverting such capital towards those countries prepared to "receive" them.
6.4. Devising an effective money laundering control system and subsequent actions requires special skills and different investigation procedures from the traditional ones.
And this is the reason why we find it so difficult to "fight" this phenomenon and call a halt to progressive national and international "invasions" into the legal economy (by business take-overs, increase of usury and gambling houses...).
6.5. The whole matter, including a "re-examination" of the crime of usury, must be completely redesigned taking into account the objective difficulties when dealing with asset investigations, the absence of a central database useful for accurate controls, the lack of rules to counteract the fictitious use of nominees and front companies. In many cases the discovery of a money laundering operation is delayed because Mafia-type organisations quickly alter their methods for recycling capital and often exert heavy pressures on "clean" businessmen to force them into acting as unsuspectable "screens" for money laundering operations.
6.6. We can therefore say that the introduction of Law Decree 143/1991 (amended by Law 197/1991) into our legal framework, is a step on the right road as far as actions are concerned, giving priority to suspicious operations (instead of individuals) and revolutionising the role of banking and financial operators.
The latest amendments to Law 328/1993 on money laundering (art. 648-bis Criminal Code) and the provisions fixing the commission of the crime even when the crime is unintentional (and not only when referring to robbery, extortion, kidnapping or drug trafficking) will undoubtedly have an impact on the smooth functioning of the "transaction" reporting system from bank managers and will cause the hiding of the source of the money involved in the operation.
6.7. While still on the subject of money laundering, we must remember the importance of art.12-quater Law Decree 306/1992 enabling law enforcement officials belonging to specialised agencies to carry out "simulated laundering", in other words to carry out simulated undercover operations penetrating the illegal circuit to uncover organised crime branches.
6.8. It is therefore a fact that an organic anti-crime strategy must be accompanied by an effective attack on Mafia assets.
There are many complaints over the lack of the necessary measures and over the difficulties involved in their implementation.
New and more adequate lines of action are under study at investigative and trial level (including preventive measures) as well as increasing public awareness is concerned.
Considerable progress has been made recently from the legal viewpoint. We can therefore hope that positive results will become decisive in the near future towards the careful enforcement of new provisions leading to the seizure (during trial) and confiscation (in the case of a conviction) of "suspicious" assets when they result unjustified and not proportioned to the declared income, or to the sphere of activity of the defendants or of those accused of Mafia crimes (see art. 12-sexies Law Decree 306/1994 plus Law 501/1994).

7. Conclusions
7.1. The importance of the provision introduced by art. 12-sexies Law Decree 306/1992 is obvious. A great novelty in our legal system is the inversion of the burden of proof in case of charges of continuous criminal behaviour resulting from membership of a organised criminal group.
7.2. It is absolutely necessary in this field, as in any other involving the aforementioned criminal organisations, to have the complete international co-operation and merging of interests and intents from all nations concerned.
7.3. However, we should not forget that the fight against organised crime is not limited only to the field of investigations and trials. Institutional commitment goes beyond the repression of crime itself, extending to various levels involving more or less directly crime-related elements. Our attention should therefore focus on the improvement of the social structure and the economic development of "depressed areas". This policy is essential to stop organised crime from becoming an alternative to social poverty. It is also the only way to encourage the development of a law-abiding mentality among the people.